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held to compel a state to adjudicate a "foreign right."
Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, a limited uniformity of law
within the federal courts was brought about by the application of the
"general law" doctrine. However, since that decision the emphasis has
been on uniformity between the state and federal courts within a given
state and the differences existing between the states, due to conflicting
laws or policies, charged to our political system.4 0 It would seem that
by the court's present interpretations of the full faith and credit or the
due process clauses the statute as construed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is constitutional. It remains to be seen whether the
United States Supreme Court in the consideration of this case, now
before it, will see fit to extend the interpretation of these clauses so as
to preclude a state from assuming the position which North Carolina
has taken.
CYRUS F. LEE.
Evidence-Negative Testimony-Silence as Hearsay
In an action to recover land sold in a tax foreclosure proceeding,
plaintiff sought to establish that the commissioner purchased at his own
sale through the wife of one L. L testified that his wife, now dead, did
not in his presence pay any consideration for the commissioner's deed
to her or receive any consideration for her deed to the commissioner,
executed a month later. L joined in the second deed and was present
when it was signed. L also stated that his wife did nothing but housework, that he knew she never inherited any money, that he never gave
her any large sum, and that he saw her every day. L's testimony (A)
that he knew all about his wife's business, (B) that he knew she neither
paid nor received anything for the deeds, and (C) that he never heard
her say she paid or received any money was excluded by the trial court.
The Supreme Court affirmed a nonsuit granted at the close of plaintiff's
evidence, and held the testimony above properly excluded by the ban
against hearsay.1 After referring to L's testimony about events occurring in his presence, the court said: "Any other knowledge he had is
necessarily predicated upon hearsay, and is incompetent." 2
(A)
A fundamental rule of admissibility is that a witness to a fact must
81 L. ed. 106 (1936); Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land
Co., 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928 (1934) ; Note
(1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 213; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct.
338. 74 L. ed. 926, 74 A. L. R. 701 (1930).
"0Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020,
1022, 85 L. ed. 1487 (1941), cited supra note 36.
'Hinson

v. Morgan, 225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945); Hinson v.

Baumrind,
225 N. C. 740, 36 S. E. (2d) 266 (1945) (companion case).
2
Id.at 744, 36 S. E. (2d) at 269.
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speak from personal knowledge. It follows that this knowledge must
be based on observation by the senses, not on hearsay, 4 and that it
must involve rational inferences from adequate data. 5 Thus, L's statement that he knew all about his wife's business is not only a bold assertion by any husband but is subject to the legal objection that his
knowledge could not be wholly from observation, but was necessarily
based in part on what his wife told him about her affairs. Although
there are exceptions to the rule, 6 testimony based'even in part on hearsay is inadmissible, 7 and exclusion of this evidence rests on that ground.
If, however, the trial court's ruling had been otherwise, it should not
have been reversible error, for no jury could have been misled by the
sweeping nature of L's assertion.
(B)
To determine the admissibility of L's statement that his wife did not
pay or receive any consideration an analysis of its foundation is necessary. If based on his wife's remarks that she paid and received nothing,
L's statement is founded directly on hearsay and is for that reason inadmissible. But his testimony as a whole reveals that she told him nothing,
that the bases for his assertion are first, his knowledge of his wife's
incapacity to pay, second, his failure to observe any payment or receipt
of money at any time, and third, his failure to hear his wife say she
paid or received any money.
Lack of money or other resources is relevant circumstantial evidence
to prove non-payment, 8 and assuming normal opportunities to observe,
L's observation of his wife's lack of resources is one support for his
conclusion that his wife did not pay for the land. Whether it is sufficient by itself is another question.
With reference to its second foundation, L's statement is negative
testimony, testimony that a fact did not occur, founded on his failure
to observe a fact which he would supposedly have observed if it had
occurred. 9 Such testimony is accepted by courts in a variety of situations, 10 the most common of which is proving failure to give warning
s Wix&oE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§650-721 (hereinafter cited as WIGMoRo).
'Id. at §657.
Id. at §§659-63.
Old. at §§665-70.
' Buck v. Robinson, 128 Conn. 376, 23 A. (2d) 157 (1941) (attorney's statement on execution of will inadmissible because based partly on hearsay) ; Finley
v. Pafford, 104 S. W. (2d) 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (testimony that deceased

invested money in certain land excluded as based on hearsay and "personal association with deceased") ; 31 C. J. S. §§200-3.
8WIGmORE

0

§89.

Id. at §664.

'0 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 11 S. Ct. 720, 35 L. ed. 371 (1890)

(witness had never, over period of years, seen insured intoxicated or intemperate) ;
Clark County Const. Co. v. Richards Administrator, 202 Ky. 276, 259 S. W. 331
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11

signals at railroad crossings. The basis for an assertion that no signal
was given or no payment was made must be that the witness would
have heard the signal or seen the payment if it had been made. The
facts must show adequately that the event could hardly have taken place
12
without his knowing about it.
Although there is no express recognition of it, the court evidently
felt that L's failure to observe any consideration passing between the
parties, either at the gigning of the deeds or at any other time, was not
sufficient ground for his conclusion. In other words, the inference from
the fact of L's non-observance to the fact of non-payment was no more
natural or probable than an inference of payment unknown to him. In
an earlier North Carolina case,13 on an issue of service of summons on
S, testimony that S's children never heard her say anything about a
summons having been served was held incompetent as akin to hearsay
and as proving nothing, "and if it proved anything, would tend to show
that she had been served.' 4 Without a showing that a witness would
have known of the event had it occurred, his negative statement is
based on insufficient testimonial knowledge and is disregarded or ex(1924) (nearby workers heard no warning or directions given decedent); Kelly
v. Knights of Father Mathew, 179 Mo. App. 608, 162 S. W. 682 (1913) (witnesses
did not hear deceased resign in open meeting) ; Strawn v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry.,
120 Mo. App. 135, 96 S. W. 488 (1906) (that particular goods were not seen or
received offered to show non-delivery of one of several cases of goods by railroad) ;
Purnell v. Raleigh & G. R. R., 122 N. C. 832, 29 S.E. 953 (1898) (witnesses
saw no light or signalman on train) ; Cawfield v. Asheville St. Ry., 111 N. C. 597,
16 S. E. 703 (1892) (street railway employees did not see plaintiff fall from
step); Henderson v. Crouse, 52 N. C. 623 (1860) (witnesses had never known
slave to be sick) ; McBee v. McBee, 22 Ore. 329, 29 Pac. 887 (1892) (witnesses
had never seen husband drunk); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Chambers, 95 S.W. 607
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (foreman never heard of broken water main) ; Bennett v.
Robertson, 107 Vt. 202, 177 AtI. 625, 98 A. L. R. 152, 161 (1935) (witness did
not see skidmark at scene of accident) ; Comstock's Administrator v. Jacobs, 84
Vt. 277, 78 At. 1017 (1911) (wife had never heard any directions given husband
by aged couple as to use of property, excluded) ; Hinton v. Cream City R. R., 65
Wis. 323, 27 N. W. 147 (1886) (passengers did not hear bell rung on trolley);
WIGMORE §664 n. 1.
11 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Stepp, 164 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) ; Carey
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 75 Cal. App. 129, 242 Pac. 97, 10 MINN. L. Rav. 543
(1926); Holmes v. Pa. R. R., 74 N. J.L. 469, 66 AtI. 412 (1907), (1909) 12
ANN. CAS. 1031, 1033; Carruthers v. Atlantic & Yadkin Ry., 218 N. C. 49, 9
S. E. (2d) 498 (1940); White v. Southern Ry., 151 Va. 302, 144 S.E. 424, 15
VA. L. REV. 199 (1928), (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 416; Notes (1930) 66
A. L. R. 1532, 1537, (1935) 98 A. L. R. 161, (1929) 42 HARv.L.REv. 422, (1936)
70 U. S. L. REV. 179.
1" Harper v. Harper, 252 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) (testimony that neighbor
observed no impropriety between defendant and plaintiff's wife inadmissible on
issue of criminal conversation); Trimble v. Tantlinger, 104 Iowa 665, 74 N. W. 25
(1898) (witnesses never heard defendant defame plaintiff, inadmissible) ; Sneed v.
Ellison, 116 S. W. (2d) 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (maker's testimony that note
was unpaid was "rank hearsay" where another person had assumed payment of
note1" and
have Commissioners
paid it).
Lakemight
Drainage
v. Spencer, 174 N. C. 36, 93 S.E. 435 (1917).
14 Ibid.
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Notice, however, that the trial judge permitted L to testify

over objection, 15' that he knew his wife never inherited any money.
Why isn't this statement open to the same objection?
As a basis for L's belief that no payment was made, the testimony
that he never heard his wife say she paid or received any money may
be questioned on two grounds. It may be hearsay, inadmissible on its
own and insufficient to bolster L's assertion of non-payment. Or even
if not hearsay, it may not provide adequate data from which a reasonable inference of non-payment can be drawn; if so, it would not be independently admissible and could not be a support for L's conclusion.

(C)
L's statement that he never heard his wife say she paid or received
anything for the deeds may be viewed in one of three ways: (1) The
wife's failure to speak, her silence, is equivalent to an extra-judicial
assertion that she neither paid nor received considertaion, introduced to

prove the truth of that assertion. Under this view, L's testimony would
be excluded as hearsay. (2) The wife's silence was not intended as nor
is it equivalent to an assertion, but is evidence of conduct offered to
show her belief that no payment was made and thus to prove nonpayment as the cause of that belief. Such conduct evidence may be
included within a broad definition of hearsay, but even so its exclusion
is not necessary in every case.1 (3) The wife's silence is circumstantial
evidence of conduct offered to prove non-payment, and its admissibility
is determined by the minimum requirement of relevancy, that is, the
15 Hestle v. Louisville & N. R. R, 16 Ala. App. 657, 81 So. 149 (1919) (testimony that witness did not see her trunk on station platform insufficient to take
question of trunk's arrival to jury); Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 92, 77 AtI.
258 (1910) (witness never heard any talk of anyone else having possession of
land, inadmissible on issue of plaintiff's adverse possession); Johnson & Sons,
Inc. v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 484, 199 S. E. 704 (1938) (evidence that witnesses
failed to hear signal insufficient to submit to jury where witnesses probably could
not have heard signal if given); Aldana v. Aldana, 42 S. W. (2d) 661, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) (during the ten years witness had known deceased he never knew
deceased had a 'wife, inadmissible) ; WIGMORE §160.
15" Neither the opinion nor the record on appeal show an objection by defendant
to this testimony, but plaintiff's attorney, in conversation with the writer, stated
that objection was made and overruled.
" See Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 192; McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, (1930) 39 YALE L. J.489; Morgan, Some
Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay,, (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rav.
258, The Hearsay Rule, (1937) 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, Hearsay and Aron-Hearsay,
(1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138. Professor Morgan's definition of hearsay includes: "(1) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, intended by him to
operate as an assertion when offered either to prove the truth of the matter
asserted or to prove that the asserter believed the matter asserted to be true, and
(2) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, not intended to operate as an
assertion, when offered either to prove both his state of mind and the external
event or condition which caused him to have that state of mind or to prove that
his state of mind was truly reflected by that conduct." 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. at
263-4.
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fact to be proved must be a natural or plausible conclusion from the
evidence offered.
In practically none of the cases presenting similar problems is there
any analysis of the testimony, and in few is the hearsay objection discussed, but a consideration of these cases throws some light on the
judicial attitude toward this type of evidence. 16' Failure to complain
of rape is admissible to prove that there was no rape but intercourse by
consent. 1 7 Failure to complain of an injury is admissible to show that
no injury occurred.' 8 Failure to hear any news is admitted to show
death of a person or loss of a ship.' 9 Failure to find or hear anything
of a person after search tends to prove that the person is fictitious or
a non-resident. 20 Failure to mention a danger of employment to one's
"" Obviously, not all of these cases are strictly analogous to the principal case,
but they present related instances of the use of silence as circumstantial evidence.
" Mosley v. State, 241 Ala. 132, 1 So. (2d) 593 (1941) ; People v. Wilmot, 139
Cal. 103, 72 Pac. 838 (1903); People v. Carruthers, 379 Il1. 388, 41 N. E. (2d)
521 (1942) ; Adams v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 711, 294 S. W. 151 (1927) ; State
v. Bigley, 247 S. W. 169 (Mo. Sup. 1922) ; State v. Dill, 184 N. C. 645, 113 S. E.
609 (1922) ; State v. Smith 138 N. C. 700, 50 S. E. 859 (1905); State v. Peter,
53 N. C. 19 (1860) ; State v. Cone, 46 N. C. 18 (1853) ; State v. Golden, 90 W.
Va. 496, 111 S. E. 320 (1922) ; 52 C. J. p. 1069.
"LPeople v. Layman, 117 Cal. App. 476, 4 P. (2d) 244 (1931) (testimony that
train dispatchers had received no report of accident on night of plaintiff's alleged
injury held not hearsay and admissible); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Varner, 129
Ga. 844, 60 S. E. 162 (1908) (failure to complain of injury admitted); West
Chicago St. Ry. v. Kennelly, 170 Ill. 508, 48 N. E. 996 (1897) (daily visitor had
not heard plaintiff complain before accident, admissible on issue of whether prior
accident caused plaintiff's injury); Sullivan v. Minn. St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200
N. W. 922 (1924) (evidence in personal injury action that no other claim was
made on defendant arising out of same accident admissible in discretion of trial
court); Fogg v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 78 Utah 105, 1 P. (2d) 954 (1931)
(in action for injury to knee during employment wife permitted to testify that
husband did not complain of pain in knee after prior auto accident) ; Lincoln v.
Hemenway, 80 Vt. 530, 69 Atl. 153 (1908) (neighbor did not hear of plaintiff's
injury until end of August, admissible to corroborate plaintiff's statement that injury occurred in August and not in April). Compare Southern Ry. v. Mayer,
159 S. C. 332, 157 S. E. 6 (1931) (testimony that owner of other land on railroad's right of way had not complained of encroachment excluded) with Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Searson, 137 S. C. 468, 135 S. E. 567 (1926) (evidence that
neither defendant nor predecessors made any complaint as to railroad right of way
admitted).
" WIGMoR §158.
'0 Nichols v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (postmaster
and others had never known of W. E. Smith and on inquiry could learn nothing of
him, admissible on fictitious person issue); People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 46
Pac. 153 (1896) (sheriff had searched region but unable to find trace of J. K.,
admitted to show non-existence) ; Elliott v. Georgia Power Co., 58 Ga. App. 151,
197 S. E. 914 (1938) (E. R. Smith never knew or heard of W. R. Smith, admitted); Phelps v. Nazworthy, 226 Ill. 254; 80 N. E. 756 (1907) (whether a
deed-grantee was a fictitious person; testimony that no person by that name had
ever lived in township held admissible); Kruidenier's Estate v. Bankers Trust
Co., 203 Iowa 776, 209 N. W. 452 (1926) (testimony of postmaster and officials
that no such person as C.M.P. appeared on their records or was heard of in
region) ; People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523, 19 N. W. 168 (1884) (sheriff's failure
to find alleged subscribing witness admissible to prove name fictitious) ; Morris v.
Equitable Life Association, 109 Neb. 348, 191 N. W. 190 (1922) (issue whether
beneficiary of policy was fictitious person; testimony of search and non-existence
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family has been admitted as evidence of ignorance of the danger. 21 The
absence of an entry in a public or private record has frequently been
used to show that an alleged transaction did not take place. 22 Failure
to deny or reply to a statement made in one's presence .is under proper
conditions an admission by silence.2 Failure to complain of food' or
merchandise, offered to show good quality, is more often excluded than
admitted, 24 but the exclusion in many cases is based on considerations
admitted); State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 217 (1858) (witness made inquiries
and searched but could obtain no information of alleged fictitious person, admitted) ; Thomas v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 97, 14 P. (2d) -953 (1932), (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 715 (sheriff testified he was unable by inquiries to learn anything
of B. F. Smith; admissible to prove B. F. Smith was fictitious, over objection as
hearsay and prejudicial); Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 283 Pa. 520, 129 Atl. 578
(1925) (special examiner could find no heirs after 1Y years search, admissible
an issue of escheat for lack of heirs) ; cf. In re Hunt, 15 N. J. Misc. 331, 191 Atl.
437 (1937) (testimony of postmen that many registered voters were fictitious or
non-resident persons admitted). Contra: Taylor v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 381, 97
S. W. 474 (1906) (sheriff's returns of "not found" on subpoenas issued for
alleged fictitious persons as witnesses excluded). WIGMORE §§158, 664.
" Spinney's Administratrix v. 0. V. Hooker & Son, 92 Vt. 146, 102 AtI. 53
(1917) (employee's failure to mention danger from electricity to show ignorance
of danger) ; Barney v. Quaker Oats Co., 85 Vt. 372, 82 Atl. 113 (1912) (deceased
employee never mentioned to family danger of dust explosion, admitted to prove
no knowledge of danger).
" Norfolk So. Ry. v. Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) (evidence
that search in records failed to reveal deed or contract held competent on issue
of execution of instrument) ; Reichert v. Jerome H. Sheip, Inc., 212 Ala. 300, 102
So. 440 (1924) (absence of entry in church records to prove no marriage); In
re Estate of Panico, 268 Ill. App. 585 (1932) (to prove no divorce, evidence that
records of courts have been searched where decree should be found, if granted,
held admissible); Hubbard v. Martin, 184 Ill. App. 534 (1914) (no record of
license issued to defendant's employee held competent to prove operator unlicensed
in suit for dental malpractice) ; Oelke v. Howey, 210 Iowa 1296, 232 N. W. 666
(1930) (absence of entry in financial statement to show no debt existed) ; Effron,
Kushner & Co. v. Amer. Ry. Express Co., 195 Iowa 1168, 193 N. W. 539 (1923)
(no entry of receipt of sack of furs, admitted) ; Klein v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
309 Pa. 320, 163 Atl. 532 (1932) (absence of entry of alleged janitor's name in
records admissible to prove not employee) ; WIGMORE §§1531-56, 1633.
"'Dail v. Heath, 206 N. C. 453, 174 S. E. 318 (1934) WIGmORE §§1071-3; 31
C. J. S. §§294-7; (1929) 24 ILL. L. Ray. 488; (1930) 28 MICH. L. Rav. 1057.
"Admissible: Steil v. Holland, 3 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) (no other
complaints from purchasers of similar woolen goods) ; Baer Grocer Co. v. Barber
Milling Co., 223 Fed. 969 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915) (no complaints on flour to prove
no deterioration in quality) ; Katz v. Delohey Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 AtI. 88
(1922) (no complaints on fur from same lot as plaintiff's to Show good quality) ;
Mears v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 75 Conn. 171, 52 Atl. 610 (1902) (express
company agent receiving box from railroad made no complaint, offered to show
that box was then in good condition) ; Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La.
App. 1939) (no other complaints about shrimp salad held "of great value . . . in
determining genuineness of plaintiff's claim"); MacLehan v. Loft Candy Stores,
172 So. 367 (La. App. 1937) (no other complaints from 300 mince pies sold) ;
Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N. E. (2d) 465 (1936) (no other
complaints from 300 turkey sandwiches sold on particular day and from all sandwiches sold during year); Monahan v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 282 Mass.
548, 185 N. E. 34 (1938) (no complaints received on any other of 72,000 cans of
corn sold by defendant); Landfield v. Albiani Lunch Co., 268 Mass. 528, 168
N. E. 160 (1929) (absence of complaints about food held "competent evidence
that it was not unwholesome"); Gracey v. Waldorf System, 251 Mass. 76, 146
N. E. 232 (1925) (no complaints on food); Kinston Cotton Mills v. Rocky Mount
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of relevancy, such as dissimilarity of circumstances. Failure to mention
a will, contract or other fact to one's family or friends is generally
25
inadmissible to prove non-existence of the fact.
Hosiery Co., 154 N. C. 462, 70 S. E. 910 (1911) (correspondence showing complaints and evidence of no complaints on yarn both admitted) ; St. Louis S. W.
Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain Co., 95 S. W. 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (failure
of other purchasers of corn to complain admitted over hearsay objection; compare
with later Texas cases below); cf. H. & L. M. Warten Cotton Co. v. McGuire,
206 Ala. 469, 91 So. 308 (1921) (fact that plaintiff heard no complaints of his
work admissible under circumstances of the case on issue of plaintiff's incompetence). Inadmissible: United States v. 11% Dozen Packages, Etc., 40 F. Supp.
208 (W. D. N. Y. 1941) (no complaints received on drug over ten-year period
held incompetent as "clearly hearsay") ; Winter-Loeb Grocery Co. v. Boykin, 203
Ala. 187, 82 So. 437 (1919) (sale of seeds); Siegel, King & Co. v. Penny &
Baldwin, 176 Ark. 336, 2 S.W. (2d) 1082 (1928) (no complaints on other pipe
sold inadmissible because circumstances may have been different and purchasers may
have been damaged without complaining); Watson v. Bigelow Co., 77 Conn. 124,
58 Atl. 741 (1904) (evidence that several small boilers were installed and operated
without complaint inadmissible to prove same design or plan suitable for much
larger boiler; objections of court were collateral issue, surprise, slight probative
force and irrelevance because of dissimilar circumstances); Hutchinson Lumber
Co. v. Dickerson, 127 Ga. 328, 56 S. E. 491 (1907) (others' acceptance of lumber
irrelevant on issue of breach of warranty on defendant's lumber) ; Van Lill Co.
v. Frederick City Packing Co., 155 Md. 303, 141 Atl. 898 (1928) (absence of
complaints from purchasers of rejected corn too remote to have probative force) ;
Webster v. Moore & Son, 108 Md. 572, 71 Atl. 466 (1908) (that other tomatoes
were sold as No: 3 standard and accepted as such without complaint irrelevant on
issue of quality of tomatoes sold defendant); Osborne & Co. v. Bell, 62 Mich.
214, 28 N. W. 841 (1886) (no complaints on other machines sold, irrelevant as
to workability of this machine); Bloom's Son Co. v. Haas, 130 Mo. App. 122 108
S. W. 1078 (1908) (shipments of rice to others without complaint held wholly
irrelevant and highly prejudicial to defendant) ; New York Canners v. Milbourne,
247 N. Y. 460, 160 N. E. 914 (1928) (no other complaints of defects in canned
potatoes; excluded because no showing of similar circumstances); James K.
Thomson Co. v. International Compositions Co., 191 App. Div. 553, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 637 (1920) (evidence that rejected goods were sold to others without complaint inadmissible as hearsay); Altkrug v. William Whitman Co., 185 App. Div.
744, 173 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1919) (no complaints from sale of rejected goods declared "hearsay evidence as to opinions of other customers") ; Shaw Cotton Mills
v. Acme Hosiery Mills, 181 N. C. 33, 106 S.E. 24 (1921) (statements in letters
that rejected goods had been resold without compliant were "at most .. .selfserving, and tended only to prove a negative"; their exclusion by trial court was
not reversible error); Reed Grocery Co. v. Miller, 36 Okla. 134, 128 Pac. 271
(1912) (no complaints from other sales of hominy "wholly irrelevant"); Goldsmith v. Ohio Truss Co., 283 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (on issue of
whether plaintiff shipped more goods than defendant ordered, evidence that no
others complained of receiving too many goods excluded) ; Elmberg Co. v. Dunlap
Hdw. Co., 267 S. W. 258 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924) (no complaints from other
machines held irrelevant) ; George W. Saunders Live Stk. Comm. Co. v. Kincaid,
168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (failure of other packers to complain of
disease in hogs inadmissible as hearsay); Hill v. Hanan & Son, 62 Tex. Civ. App.
567, 82 S.W. 532 (1904) (no complaints from other machines, excluded because
similar conditions not proven).
" Admissible: Latham v. Houston Land & Trust Co., 62 S.W. (2d) 519 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933) (testimony that widow and attorney had never heard alleged
settlor mention trust fund held not hearsay and admissible on issue of existence
of fund) ; Sloan v. Sloan, 32 S.W. (2d) 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (deceased
did not state at dinner party that he and plaintiff were married, admitted on issue
of marriage) ; Donovan v. Selinas, 85 Vt. 80, 81 Atl. 235 (1911) (fact that member of household never heard husband claim ownership of property relevant to
show wife's ownership).
Inadmissible: Planters' Chemical & Oil Co. v. Stearnes, 189 Ala. 503, 66 So.
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The cases point to two conclusions. First, courts are much more
likely to admit evidence of negative conduct or silence where evidence
of a positive nature on the same point would be admissible. Thus,
complaint of rape or injury would come in as corroboration or under
an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of physical condition
or spontandous exclamations. 26 Replies to a searcher's questions, acknowledging acquaintance with a person or giving directions. as to his
whereabouts, would be admissible because used as circumstantial evidence of such person's existence and not to prove the truth of the
replies. 27 Likewise, an employee's comments about danger would be
admitted to show his knowledge, but not to prove that danger existed.
28
Regular entries in records are within an exception to the hearsay rule.
So are admissions, whether by statement or by silence. On the other
hand, complaints about food or merchandise, and remarks about wills,
contracts, business transactions, etc., are clearly banned by the hearsay
rule.
Second, to strengthen the inference from a person's silence about an
event to non-occurrence of the event, a showing that if the event had
occurred it would have been important to him to speak out, or that
failure to do so would have been detrimental, is desirable, if not necessary.29 The disadvantages of failure to complain of rape or injury or
failure to deny an incriminating assertion made in one's presence are
obvious. The detrimental effect of silence in the face of poor quality
food or goods argues for the admissibility of this type of evidence. On
the other band, the fact that a wife did not reveal her financial transactions to her husband might be a benefit rather than a detriment to
her; this is a real weakness of the evidence in the principal case.
Of the three possible views on the final testimony of witness L, the
699 (1914) (testimony that signers never heard any of other signers say they
signed notes individually inadmissible except as it tends to contradict plaintiff's
evidence that they signed as individuals); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 22 Ala. 529 (1853)
(relatives and neighbors of decedent had not heard of will before his death);
Segars v. City of Cornelia, 60 Ga. App. 457, 4 S. E. (2d) 60 (1939) (that wife
said nothing to husband about signing easement, though they consulted each other
about all business transactions, excluded; wife's denial of signing would be hearsay); Sherling v. Continental Trust Co., 175 Ga. 672, 165 S. E. 560 (1932)
'(testator never said anything to witnesses about alleged oral contract of testator,
to prove no contract existed; held irrelevant, immaterial and in nature of hearsay); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901) (testimony
that defendant's son never heard anything said in family about defendant having
trouble with her stepdaughter, and never heard stepdaughter mention that defendant injured her); Lake Drainage Commissioners v. Spencer, 174 N. C. 36,
93 S. E. 435 (1917); Karlen v. Trebble, 45 S. D. 570, 189 N. W. 519 (1922)
(witness living with plaintiff had not heard plaintiff's mother or father or anyone
else claim ownership of auto, held incompetent for any purpose).
, WIGMOaE §§1134-42, 1714-23, 1760-4.

'Id. at §1789.
291d. at §§1517-61, 1630-84, 1702-8.
" Falknor, supra note 16, at 215-7.
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third is the soundest by analysis. The weakness of the first view, that
silence is the equivalent of an assertion, is that it overlooks the nonassertive quality of this conduct, When conduct is intended to convey
thought, as when a criminal makes a pre-arranged signal to his confederate, it should be treated just as an assertion. But a failure to mention
payment or non-payment of a debt to a spouse is no more intended as
an assertion than a failure to complain of a shipment of goods or a
failure to stop a car at a clear, unobstructed intersection. As a result
no question of the veracity or narration of the actor is involved, and
there is no necessity for cross-examination of the actor as to these
factors before accepting the testimony of the witness 3 0
The second theory is that the relevance of this conduct as evidence
depends on inferences from A's conduct to belief to fact believed, and
that dangers inherent in hearsay are sufficiently present to require its
classification as hearsay. 3 ' Admitting that A's veracity and narration
are not involved, the argument runs that since A's belief must accurately
reflect the fact or event for the evidence to be competent, A's perception
and memory are important; and opportunity to cross-examine A to discover unconscious errors in perception and memory is as necessary
as with ordinary hearsay declarations.3 2 However, differences between
evidence of inaction or silence offered to prove a negative fact and evidence of positive action or conduct are discernible. There can be no
interval of time between the inaction or silence and the negative fact
which it is offered to prove, and hence no opportunity for failure of
memory. For example, X's failure tW complain of an injury at any time
is offered to show that he was not injured at any time; X's state of
mind is continuous and contemporaneous with both the conduct (silence) and the fact to be proved (no injury). As for perception, the
opportunities for error here are minimized by the fact that the proof is
of the non-occurrence of an event, and the actor is in a position to know
definitely by observation that the event did not occur.
The true weaknesses of L's testimony that he never heard his spouse
say anything about the transaction are not inadequacies in her observation, memory, narration and veracity which would be revealed by crossexamination of the wife. Thus the reasons for the hearsay rule are not
present and the rule should not be applied to this evidence.
The real objection to the testimony lies in the inferences which must
be drawn to make the wife's silence relevant as circumstantial evidence
of non-payment. The disturbing question is whether the assumption
is justified that if L's wife had paid she would have told him, and
" WiGmoRE §459; Falknor, supra, at 195-201.

"' Morgan, mtpra note 16, passim.
" Morgan, supra note 16, 48 HARV. L. REv. at 1141-3.
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whether, if this assumption be granted, the evidence is of sufficient probative value to meet the minimum test for admissibility. In most of the
cases cited, the hearsay rule is not discussed, and the evidence is admitted or excluded on the basis of its relevancy; this indicates that the
third view of this conduct evidence is simplest and most natural. The
test should be the same for silence as for other circumstantial evidence:
Does the fact of silence point to the non-happening of the event or condition as a natural or plausible hypothesis out of the various ones conceivable?3 Or are the inferences from silence to non-occurrence too
weak to make the proffered evidence relevant as judicial proof?
To admit the evidence of silence on a particular issue of fact, the
trial judge should find, using an objective test, that the silence was not
intended as an assertion, that the silent individual knew or had sufficient opportunity to know the fact, and that the other circumstances lend
support to the inference that if the fact had been otherwise there would
have been no silence. Judged by this test, L's statement that he never
heard his wife say she paid or received any money might well have been
admitted as tending to prove that no consideration changed hands.
More important than the particular ruling of the lower court, however,
is the attitude of the Supreme Court on appeal. To secure a flexible
and sensible operation of this rule a broad discretion must be given the
trial judge, and his ruling, whether to admit or exclude, should be upheld unless in the opinion of the appellate court it contributes materially
to an incorrect result below.
WALLACE C. MURCHISON.

"WIGmORE §§24-36.

